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GEOMETRY, INFERENCE, COMPLEXITY, AND
DEMOCRACY
JORDAN S. ELLENBERG
Abstract. Decisions about how the population of the United States
should be divided into legislative districts have powerful and not fully
understood effects on the outcomes of elections. The problem of under-
standing what we might mean by “fair districting” intertwines math-
ematical, political, and legal reasoning; but only in recent years has
the academic mathematical community gotten directly involved in the
process. I’ll report on recent progress in this area, how newly devel-
oped mathematical tools have affected real political decisions, and what
remains to be done. This survey represents the content of a lecture pre-
sented by the author in the Current Events Bulletin session of the Joint
Mathematics Meetings in January 2020.
1. What does it mean to be represented?
Democratic states are founded on the principle that every citizen’s views
are to be represented in the conduct of the government. This principle, like
most important principles, is easy to state, difficult to make precise, and
almost impossible to implement in a fully satisfying way.
For one thing, democratic states are big. Even a modestly sized city
is large enough that it would be impractical for every decision about zon-
ing, school curriculum, public transport, and taxes to be put to a public
plebiscite, let alone to arrive at a consensus. So modern governments typi-
cally operate under some form of representative democracy, in which a small
group of legislators are elected by the population to write laws and vote on
their passage. But how to generate this group of popular representatives?
There are a lot of different ways. In Israel, voters vote for their preferred
political party, which is awarded a number of seats in the Knesset roughly
in proportion to its share of the popular vote, and then the party chooses
the occupants of those seats. For the Senate of the Phillippines, each voter
casts a vote for as many as twelve candidates, and the top twelve vote-getters
overall join the Senate. The most common means of choosing representa-
tives, though, is the one used by the United States Congress and by the
legislatures of most of the states; the population is divided up into legisla-
tive districts, and each district chooses a representative by plurality vote.
Under a district system, every voter has a specific representative who, in
theory, governs on their behalf and with attention to their interests.
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2 JORDAN S. ELLENBERG
In some systems, this partition of the electorate reflects natural (or at
least historically settled) political divisions. Each U.S. state has two U.S.
Senators, because, at least formally, each state is a semi-autonomous po-
litical entity with its own particular interests. (These are thus examples
of multi-member districts, a variant of single-member districting in which
each district selects not just one but several representatives in the legisla-
ture; multimember districts are also used for a few US state legislatures.)
The partition is almost always along geographic lines, though not always.
In New Zealand, Ma¯ori people have their own electoral districts, which are
superimposed on the general districts; Ma¯ori voters have the choice in each
election whether to vote in the Ma¯ori or the general district containing their
residence. Or the partition might not have any geographic component at
all. In Hong Kong, there’s a seat in the Legislative Council only teachers
and school administrators can vote for, one of 30 seats elected by so-called
functional constituencies. The Centuriate Assembly of the Roman Repub-
lican had constituencies separated by wealth bracket. In the upper house
of the Oireachtas in Ireland, there is a three-seat constituency consisting of
students and graduates of Trinity College Dublin, and another for alumni
of the National University of Ireland.
Electoral districts within U.S. states are a different story. They are
patches of land without much meaning. Nobody in the 2nd Congressional
District of Wisconsin, where I live, wears a WI-2 sweatshirt, or could rec-
ognize the district from its silhouette. As for my state legislative district, I
had to look it up to be sure I had the number right. These districts have to
be determined somehow, despite lacking robust pre-existing political identi-
ties; that is, someone has to select a partition of the population of the state
chosen from the ensemble of all possible partitions, a set of unmanageably
large size. This process, historically, has not been the subject of much pub-
lic attention. That has now changed. That’s because we now understand
something we didn’t fully grasp before, which is at least in part a mathe-
matical statement; that the way the population is broken up into districts
has an enormous effect on the makeup of a legislature.
To some extent this is obvious. If I am in complete control of the dis-
tricting of Wisconsin, with the power to partition the population any way I
wish, and there is a cabal of like-minded people I want to be in control of the
state, I could simply make each one of those people their own district, and
then create one more district consisting of everybody else. My hand-picked
candidates vote for themselves and then rule the legislature with at most
one potential voice of opposition.
That’s not fair! Certainly the people of Wisconsin, with the exception
of the cabal itself, would be right to feel themselves unrepresented in the
decision-making of the state.
In real life, no one tries to implement a scheme like this. For one thing,
state governments are not allowed to create districts with radically different
populations; though until the 1964 Supreme Court decision in Reynolds v.
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Sims, state governments in the United States could, and did, do exactly
this. In the United Kingdom, so-called “rotten boroughs” with only a few
dozen voters were common until the 19th century.
Nowadays, in the United States and many other representative democra-
cies (though not Canada!) districts are fixed by law to be approximately
equal in size. That prevents the kind of cabalization of the legislature I
described above. But it is not, it turns out, sufficient to keep the choice of
partition from having a dramatic influence on the outcome of the election.
The manipulation of district boundaries in order to achieve a desired out-
come (most commonly a majority or supermajority of seats for one’s own
party, or protection of incumbent legislators) is often called gerrymander-
ing, after a 19th-century Massachusetts governor sometimes thought of as a
pioneer of the practice. In most states, the power to determine legislative
districts is held by the legislature itself, creating an obvious incentive and
opportunity for a disciplined partisan majority to protect itself from the will
of an unfriendly electorate.
We are faced with the following ensemble of questions. We write Π =
{Π1, . . . ,Πk} for a partition of the state’s population into k subsets. We
want to know:
• What properties should Π have in order to be considered “fair”?
• Given a proposed Π, are there quantitative measurements of unfair-
ness which are robust, reliable, and simple enough to be used by
judges and courts who have to decide whether Π is too unfair to
use?
• In a U.S. context, what kind of constraints on Π do the US and
state constitutions allow us to impose, and what kind of constraints
do those constitutions require us to impose?
Are these actually math questions? They are also not not math questions.
But they have a legal, a political, and a philosophical strand as well, and the
strands can’t really be unwound from each other. If mathematicians work
on these problems alone, ignoring the other strands, the results are not
going to be very useful. (“Why don’t we just draw a grid over the state and
make each box a district....?”) But when lawyers and politicians think about
redistricting while neglecting the mathematical strand, the result of their
work will be no better; and that, by and large, is exactly how these issues
have been addressed through most of American history. In recent years, I am
happy to report, there has been a flowering of truly interdisciplinary work,
involving both serious mathematics and conscientious attention to political
and legal realities, and we have begun to move toward a way of thinking
about legislative districting which is sound from all the relevant points of
view. In these notes I’ll try to give a brief summary of recent progress in
this area.
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2. Measures of fairness
What do we mean when we say a districting is “fair” to the residents of a
state? A good way to get a sense of the difficulties here is to contemplate a
toy example. Imagine a state with a population of just 100 people, of whom
60 are members of the Purple Party and 40 vote for the Orange Party. The
population of this state is partitioned into five legislative districts. Here are
four ways the task could be done:
Π1 :
Purple Orange
15 5
15 5
15 5
7 13
8 12
Π2 :
Purple Orange
9 11
9 11
9 11
17 3
16 4
Π3 :
Purple Orange
14 6
14 6
13 7
11 9
8 12
Π4 :
Purple Orange
12 8
12 8
12 8
12 8
12 8
Each of these districtings obeys the constraint that districts be of equal
size. But the legislatures they produce are very different. In Π1, the Purple
Party holds three seats and the Orange Party two. In Π2, the Orange Party
holds a legislative majority, with three out of the five seats. In Π3, Purple
holds a 4-1 majority of seats. And in Π4, Purple holds all five seats and
Orange is utterly shut out.
Which of these choices is the most fair? Which is the least?
With this toy case in mind, let’s talk about the main existing flavors of
quantitative measures of fairness.
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2.1. Proportional representation. One of the most broadly popular and
intuitively appealing measures of districting fairness is provided by the prin-
ciple of proportional representation.
Definition 2.1. A districting satisfies proportional representation when the
proportion of seats held by each party is equal to the proportion of votes
won by that party.
Of the districtings above, only Π1 satisfies proportional representation;
the Purple Party got 60 percent of the vote, and it holds 60 percent of the
seats. Achieving proportional representation is often seen as a goal, or even
the goal, of districting reform. The New York Times, in a 2018 feature
story on gerrymandering, wrote of Pennsylvania’s Congressional districts:
“Republicans got 54 percent of U.S. House votes statewide, but won 13 of
18 seats,” suggesting that this deviation of seat proportion from vote pro-
portion is the problem districting reform is meant to solve. Supreme Court
Justice Neal Gorsuch, in the oral arguments on the redistricting case Rucho
v. Common Cause, also took this to be the standard at issue, pointedly
asking, “[A]ren’t we just back in the business of deciding what degree of
tolerance were willing to put up with from proportional representation?”
I hope it is clear at the very outset that this definition suffers from many
practical problems. For one thing, it is impossible to satisfy exactly; the
proportion of votes cast for a party need not be anywhere near a rational
number whose denominator is the number of districts! This is most notable
in states consisting of a single Congressional district; we accept, without
hesitation, that whoever gets the most votes should occupy 100% of the
seats, even though the proportion of votes that candidate received may be
far from 1.
Would fairly drawn maps even be likely to yield proportional represen-
tation? It’s unlikely. Look at the Wyoming State Senate, for instance.
Wyoming is by some measures the most strongly Republican state in Amer-
ica. Two-thirds of its voters picked Donald Trump in 2016, and the same
proportion voted Republican in the governor’s race in 2018. But the state
senate isn’t two-thirds Republican; there are 27 GOP senators and only 3
Democrats. That shouldn’t necessarily be seen as unfair! When a state’s
population is two-thirds Republican, the likelihood is that most geographic
segments of the state are pretty Republican. In the extreme case of this,
where the state is utterly homogeneous politically, every district would be
represented by a Republican Senator. This is the situation depicted in Π4.
By the central limit theorem, these are the kinds of districts we’d get if
we selected the districting entirely at random from the set of all possible
partitions of the state’s population into equal-cardinality pieces, with no at-
tention paid to geography. Real-life states, even Wyoming, are not exactly
homogeneous; but they also often don’t look like Π1, in which there’s not
a single district that approximates the overall political distribution of the
state. When districts are drawn geographically, an intermediate scenario
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like Π3 is more common: substantial variation from the statewide average,
but with some concentration around that average.
The final problem with asking districtings to approximate a proportional
representation system is that it’s not our system. We have chosen to accept,
for instance, that parties with small but geographically dispersed support
don’t get representation in the legislature. The proportion of Americans
voting for Libertarian candidates for the House of Representatives consis-
tently hovers around 1%; but there has never been a representative from
that party, let alone the 3− 5 that strict proportional representation would
recommend. (In Canada, whose elections are very similar to those in the
U.S., the deviations are even starker; in the 2019 federal elections there, the
New Democratic Party drew 16% of the vote against only 8% for the Bloc
Que´be´cois, but the Bloc, whose voters are concentrated in a single province,
won substantially more seats in Parliament.)
This is not a matter of mathematical or purely philosophical fairness; it’s
a decision the United States made a long time ago, baked into the way our
legal system views elections. No matter how many party-line voters there
are in practice, our votes are formally for people, not parties.
2.2. Partisan symmetry. One visually effective way to think about mea-
sures of fairness of a districting Π is the seats-votes curve. This is just what
it says on the box; the locus {(x, y)} ∈ [0, 1]×[0, 1] consisting of points where
x is the proportion of overall votes going to a party and y is the proportion
of legislative seats that party wins. There is a separate seats-votes curve
for each party; in the present US-centric discussion, we are going to stick to
cases where only two parties compete (sorry, Libertarians!) in which case
the seats-votes curve for one party is the image of the seats-votes curve for
the other by the transformation (x, y) 7→ (1− x, 1− y).
Proportional representation is the requirement that the curve is just the
line x = y. But here we should be careful. There are only finitely many
elections held under a given district map, and so this curve is something we
have only finitely many points on; what’s more, it’s certainly possible for
two different elections to yield the same vote share but different seat shares,
depending on the distribution of votes; what’s still more, elections held in
different years may be held under the same geographic district maps but
don’t represent exactly the same districting, some voters inevitably having
moved out of the district, into the district, off this mortal coil, etc. So the
seats-votes curve is probably best thought of as a cloud of points around an
ideal curve, and we may use as a criterion of fairness that the ideal curve
has certain properties. That it be x = y on the nose is, we have argued, too
much to ask.
Partisan symmetry is a much more modest request:
Definition 2.2. A districting satisfies partisan symmetry if the seats-votes
curve is invariant under the symmetry (x, y) 7→ (1− x, 1− y).
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This criterion seems very natural: if the Purple Party gets 4 seats with
60% of the vote, then the Orange Party should get 4 seats if it gets 60%
of the vote. In particular, under the partisan symmetry constraint, a party
that gets exactly half the votes gets exactly half the seats.
One challenge for this notion is that it asks us to test whether a curve
satisfies a symmetry criterion when we have access only to a set of points
on the curve (or, really, a set of points near the curve.) If we want to test
whether the curve is x = y, that’s no problem; we can use the difference
between the measured x and the measured y as our measure on unfairness.
In order to test symmetry, we would have to probe the seats-votes curve
further, inferring something about the results of elections that might have
happened, but didn’t. As a simple rule of thumb, for instance, we might
imagine that partisan swings are roughly uniform across districts. So in
Π1, if we moved the overall voteshare to 50 − 50, we would similarly shift
2 votes from Purple to Orange in each of the five districts; then Purple still
wins three seats, by the narrower margin of 13 to 7, and Orange still wins
two, now in 14− 6 and 15− 5 blowouts. This means partisan symmetry has
been violated, since Purple still holds a majority of seats while getting only
half the votes. More generally, the approximate seat curve for Π1 would be
given by the step function
y = 3σ(x+ 0.15) + σ(x− 0.25) + σ(x− 0.2)
where σ(x) is 1 for x > 0.5 and 0 for x ≤ 0.5. The reader can check that
this seats-votes curve is not symmetric; indeed, its image under (x, y) 7→
(1 − x, 1 − y) is the seats-votes curve for Π2. The only one of the four
districtings we showed which satisfies partisan symmetry in this sense is
Π4.
Another criticism: partisan symmetry may reflect factors other than self-
interested malfeasance. The districting Π2 awards a majority of seats to the
Orange Party, even as they get thumped by the Purples in the popular vote.
But what if the Purples of the state are packed into a couple of dark-Purple
metro areas, set against the background of a countryside that leans orange?
Isn’t it possible you’d see results a lot like this, without any self-dealing? Is
“organic partisan asymmetry” like this actually unfair? If we ask the state
to vote on a ballot referendum, people who feel strongly about the issue
don’t get more votes than people who barely care. Some would apply the
same reasoning to geographic regions: each patch of land gets one vote in
the legislature, even though some patches may be strong supporters of one
party while others are more ambivalent.
2.3. Efficiency gap. In the last decade, law professor Nicholas Stephanopou-
los and political scientist Eric McGhee introduced and popularized a new
metric for unfairness, called the efficiency gap. [22] To see what motivates
their definition, look back at our four example districtings. What makes Π2
such a good choice for Orange? It’s that Orange voters are deployed with
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exquisite strategic precision, to exactly the districts where they’re needed
to ensure a narrow victory. Purple voters, by contrast, are in exactly the
wrong places; almost half of them reside in the three districts where Purple
loses narrowly, and thus they contribute nothing to Purple’s representation
in the statehouse. One might say their votes were wasted. This leads us to
a definition.
Definition 2.3. Suppose the candidates in a two-party election receive A
and B votes, respectively, with A ≥ B. Then the number of wasted votes for
the losing candidate is B, and the number of wasted votes for the winning
candidate is A− (1/2)(A+B).1
This captures the notion that a vote is wasted just insofar as it fails to
contribute to a candidate’s victory. A districting drawn to favor one party
does so by causing the other party to waste votes. That motivates the
definition of efficiency gap.
Definition 2.4. Suppose the total number of wasted votes for the two
parties in an election is w1 and w2 respectively, and the total number of
votes cast in the election is N . Then the efficiency gap is (1/N)(w1 − w2).
For example, in Π1, the Purple party wastes 5 votes in each of the three
seats they win, and 7 and 8 votes respectively in the two seats they lose, for
a total of 30. The Orange party, by contrast, also wastes 5 votes in the first
three districts, but only 3 and 2 in the two districts where they win, totaling
to 20. So the efficiency gap here is 10/100 = 0.1, favoring the Orange party.
In Π2, the efficiency gap is much larger, 0.3 favoring Orange. In Π3, the
efficiency gap is 0.1 in favor of Purple, and in Π4 the efficiency gap is 0.3 in
Purple’s direction. This measure rates Π1 and Π3 as the fairest districtings;
so do most people who look at those four tables, which is a point in efficiency
gap’s favor.
Another bonus of efficiency gap is that, unlike partisan symmetry, it
doesn’t require any imputation of election results under conditions other
than the real ones; it computes its measure directly from the election re-
sults that have already happened. Efficiency gap has this in common with
proportional representation, and indeed the two measures are very similar
in spirit; both specify exactly what they want the seats-votes curves to be.
Proposition 2.5. A two-party election (with all districts of equal size) in
which one party receives proportion x of the votes and proportion y of the
seats has efficiency gap 2(x− 1/2)− (y − 1/2). In particular, the efficiency
cap is zero when y = 2x− 1/2.
The latter statement means efficiency gap can be thought of as measuring
adherence to the seats-votes curve y = 2x− 1/2, instead of the curve y = x
1We are not going to worry in this space about the difference between half the votes
and half the votes plus one.
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required by proportional representation. In other words, those two criteria
are not only different, they are incompatible!
Proof. For each district pii, let xi be the proportion of votes won by the first
party. Let yi be 1/2 if the first party wins and −1/2 if the second party wins.
So the average of yi over all districts is y − 1/2, and the average of xi over
all districts is x. The proportion of votes in pii which are wasted votes for
the first party is then xi−(1/2)(yi +1/2), and the proportion of votes which
are wasted votes for the second party is (1− xi)− (1/2)(−yi + 1/2), so the
difference – the quantity whose average over all districts is the efficiency gap
– is 2xi−yi−1. Thus the efficiency gap is 2x−1− (y−1/2) = 2x−y−1/2,
as claimed. 
The efficiency gap was a huge step forward for attempts to bring mathe-
matical reasoning to bear on the legal problem of districting. Prior to the
efficiency gap, courts had typically declined to intervene in partisan gerry-
mandering cases, following the Supreme Court ruling in Vieth v. Jubelirer
that there was no sufficiently clear standard for distinguishing a gerryman-
dered map from a fair one. The efficiency gap filled that, well, gap. It is easy
to compute, it doesn’t rely on any hypotheticals, it’s clearly distinct from
proportional representation, and it conforms well with our native intuition
about what makes a districting unfair. It formed the centerpiece of Whitford
v. Gill, the case against the state legislative districts drawn in Wisconsin
after the 2010 census. The new maps created a sharp rise in efficiency gap
which persisted in several consecutive elections following redistricting. That
evidence (together with ample documentation that the map was drawn with
the specific intent to help the Republican party) convinced a three-judge
federal panel to throw out those districts.
But the efficiency gap isn’t the end of the story. For one thing, it is
surely too strict. Like the proportional representation standard, it asks for
adherence to a specific seats-votes curve. Do we really think one curve suits
all states at all times? The curve 2(x−1/2) = (y−1/2) also has the problem
that it’s literally impossible for the outcome to match that curve if one party
gets more than 75% of the vote (though admittedly this scenario is extremely
rare, even in states like Wyoming where one party is much more popular than
the other.) All these difficulties are, of course, superable. Legal arguments
based on the efficiency gap don’t propose a strict standard where a map
with efficiency gap exceeding some threshhold are automatically declared
unconstitutional; rather, a high value of the efficiency gap is to be used as a
“red flag” providing evidence, but not dispositive evidence, that a map has
been gerrymandered.
Another vulnerability of the efficiency gap standard arises directly from
one of its strengths. The efficiency gap depends on real outcomes, not
hypotheticals. But that makes the efficiency gap discontinuous. At its heart
is the function yi in Proposition 2.5, which can jump from −1/2 to 1/2 with
a tiny change in vote share. A districting that fails an efficiency gap test
10 JORDAN S. ELLENBERG
might easily pass if a few close races switched their outcome. That feels
wrong. (Though of course there are workarounds; one might, for instance,
report the distribution of efficiency gap on a small ball around the actual
outcome rather than relying on a single point)
The efficiency gap measure has another problem in the U.S. context.
American courts have generally not been sympathetic to the idea that po-
litical parties with substantial support have a constitutionally guaranteed
right to legislative representation. Claims made by individual voters that
they’ve suffered harm to their ability to vote, or their first amendment right
to express their politics, have been more successful. So a suit filed against
a district map has to argue that individual voters have had their rights re-
moved, or at least meaningfully shaved down. Which voters are these? It
can’t just be someone whose vote was “wasted,” in the efficiency gap sense;
after all, in every single district, half the votes cast are wasted, whether
gerrymandering takes place or not! The design of the efficiency gap mea-
sure is purely global; it doesn’t tell you, because it wasn’t designed to tell
you, which districts are the ones that were maliciously modified to help one
party. A detailed critique of the efficiency gap from a mathematical per-
spective can be found in [1]; for further description and several more refined
measurements in the spirit of the efficiency gap, see [23].
2.4. Ensemble sampling. I have discussed a lot of simple answers to a
complex question, each of which has real merits, each of which is in some
ways lacking. Now we turn to the part where deeper mathematics comes
into play; I want to discuss the method of ensemble sampling, which in my
view is the current state of the art for measuring gerrymandering.
Let’s return to our basic question. What does a district map that isn’t
gerrymandered look like? Does it look more like Π1,Π2,Π3, or Π4? We
have seen that attempts to assign a numerical unfairness score to a map
based on a single election outcome all have problems, and not all agree
about the relative fairness of the four districtings in our toy example.
And why should they agree? After all, fairness isn’t purely a matter
of the numbers on the spreadsheet; some actual knowledge of the political
landscape to be partitioned is required. If partisanship in a state is homo-
geneously distributed, the same in the east as in the west, in the north and
in the south, then any geographically based map is going to look like Π4,
with all seats having roughly the same partisan distribution as the whole
state. In that case, one party will hold all or almost all the seats, even if
their statewide share of the vote is only a modest minority. In a state like
that, a seat distribution closer to proportional representation, or to zero
efficiency gap, would be strong evidence for gerrymandering, not for its ab-
sence. Likewise, in a state where one party’s support was concentrated in
a geographic region, a districting like Π4 would be ironclad proof someone
had their thumb pressed firmly on the scale.
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The philosophy behind ensemble sampling is a simple one: the opposite of
gerrymandering isn’t proportional representation or adherence to any other
strict numerical standard; the opposite of gerrymandering is not gerryman-
dering. If we want to know whether a map is fair, the right question is
Does this district map tend to produce outcomes similar to a
map that would have been drawn by an authority who wasn’t
aiming to privilege one party’s interests over another?
That neatly solves some of the problems with the measures described
above, but at the expense of introducing a new problem, which is now not
really legal or philosophical but inferential: how can we assess what would
have happened if the maps had been drawn without prejudice? The idea
of studying gerrymandering through this lens was first popularized in an
influential 2013 paper by the political scientists Jowei Chen and Jonathan
Rodden [5]. They were troubled by the issues above, especially the phenom-
enon mentioned at the end of section 2.2: when Democrats are predominant
in cities and present in moderate numbers throughout the state, while Re-
publicans are concentrated in more rural districts and almost entirely absent
from more densely populated areas, partisan symmetry can fail even when
districts are drawn indifferently to partisan advantage. How do we distin-
guish an asymmetric districting like Π2 that arises from gerrymandering
from one that reflects the disinclination of Oranges to live in Purpleopolis?2
Chen and Rodden write:
To what extent is observed pro-Republican electoral bias a
function of human geography rather than intentional gerry-
mandering? To what extent might pro-Republican bias per-
sist in the absence of partisan and racial gerrymandering?
The main contribution of this paper is to answer these
questions by generating a large number of hypothetical al-
ternative districting plans that are blind as to party and
race, relying only on criteria of geographic contiguity and
compactness. We achieve this through a series of automated
districting simulations. The simulation results provide a use-
ful benchmark against which to contrast observed districting
plans.
Where do the “hypothetical alternative districting plans” come from?
That’s where ensemble sampling comes in. First of all, let’s rephrase the
basic fairness question along the lines of the Chen-Rodden approach:
Does this district map tend to produce outcomes similar to
a map randomly selected from the set of all possible maps?
2Proponents of proportional representation are right to pipe up here and ask, why do
we need to make this distinction? Isn’t partisan bias unfair whether or not it’s enacted
on purpose? Maybe so – but the legal and political barriers to moving away from one-
geographic-district-one-seat are a lot higher than anything else described here.
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This suits our intuition; one might imagine, as a first approximation, that
a map-drawer indifferent to who wins would consider any partition of the
population into equally-sized geographic chunks to be as good as any other.
Or one might very reasonably not assume that. Each state has its own con-
stitutional and other legal constraints on what districts can look like – for
example, in most states they need to be connected – and overlaid on these
is the federal Voting Rights Act, which guarantees that among the Con-
gressional districts there are, where possible, majority-minority “districts of
opportunity.”
It gets more complicated still. Mathematicians often think of the law
as consisting of a series of hard and fast rules, like axioms, from which
outcomes can be drawn. Law isn’t really like that. Law probably couldn’t
be like that. In the case of districting, one quickly finds that much of the
relevant law is not so much a set of constraints as a collection of preferences.
In Wisconsin, for instance, legislative districts are not supposed to cross
county lines, except that decades of precedent have established that they
can cross county lines when other legal requirements make it necessary, but
it’s better not to do it too much. We also have a constitutional requirement
that state legislative districts be “as compact as practicable.” What does
that mean? It is certainly not a strict numerical constraint on the pair
(perimeter, area) in R2. We can capture all this by refining our question
one more time:
Does this district map tend to produce outcomes similar to
a map randomly selected from the set of all legally permissi-
ble maps, on which we place a probability distribution that
reflects this state’s legal preferences between districts?
The standard is then that unfair maps are ones which are extreme outliers
in that distribution – that is, those that look like this:
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This diagram, from a 2017 paper of Herschlag, Ravier, and Mattingly [15],
depicts the results of a simulation of the 2012 Wisconsin State Assembly elec-
tion, under 19,184 alternative districting plans sampled from their ensemble.
The outcomes form a reasonably normalish distribution centered on a modal
outcome of 55 Republican seats out of 99. In our world, under the maps
drawn by the Republican majority in the state legislature.after the 2010
census, the Republicans won 60 seats. We note in passing that Herschlag-
Ravier-Mattingly’s finding matches that of Chen and Rodden concerning
“unintentional gerrymandering”; Wisconsin is a state where two large ur-
banized areas (Madison and Milwaukee) strongly favor Democrats and only
one (Waukesha County) strongly favors Republicans, and indeed, in the 2012
election where the popular vote for Assembly candidates was very close to
evenly split between Democrats and Republicans, a typical map drawn with-
out prejudice gives Republicans a modest majority of seats, though much
less than the majority supplied by the gerrymandered map in actual use.
As you’ve probably noticed, there’s a major methodological issue we’ve
been keeping silent about. How do we sample from the set of all permissible
maps? This is no small question, and it’s the hardest mathematical part of
the problem. Wisconsin has 6, 672 voting wards. The number of ways to
partition those wards into 99 Assembly districts is big – really big, massively
uncomputably big. It is 996672, if you ignore all constraints on what makes
an assembly map permissible.
Now just because a set is big doesn’t mean you can’t uniformly sample
from it. It’s easy to choose an integer uniformly at random from the interval
[0, 10100]. Or to choose a spanning tree from a graph on 1000 vertices; you
can do this efficiently via Wilson’s algorithm. Closer to the problem at hand,
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the set of all partitions of Wisconsin’s wards very easy to sample uniformly
– just hand each ward an integer uniformly and independently chosen from
{1, . . . , 99}.
But that’s not the sample we want. First of all, we need the districts to
be of approximately equal size. But more than that, we need the districts to
be contiguous, not built out of wards scattered all over the state from Turtle
Lake to Oconomowoc. We can think of the wards as forming a weighted
planar graph, where each vertices is a ward and two wards are connected
if they border each other. Then a collection of wards forms a contiguous
district just when the set of vertices corresponding to that collection induces
a connected subgraph. If Γ is a graph, we define a connected k-partition to
be a partition of the vertices into subsets V1, . . . , Vk such that the induced
subgraph on each Vi is connected.
Now we’re faced with a question in the theory of algorithms: given a
weighted planar graph on N nodes, how do you randomly sample from the
set of connected k-partitions whose constituents have roughly equal total
weight? This is not so easy. Even when k = 2, this problem is NP-hard [20].
But lots of NP-hard problems have tractable approximations. If we want
to sample from an unknown distribution on the vertices of a very large
graph, one can often do very well in practice by means of a random walk
on the graph. (In pure math, a well-known example of this technique is the
product replacement algorithm for choosing a uniform random element of a
large finite group; see [14].) The idea of using this kind of Markov chain
in the context of redistricting originated with Mattingly-Vaughn [17] and
Fifield et al [13]. It has become the dominant method of ensemble sampling
among mathematicians working in this area.
The graph we’re sampling from is not the graph Γ of wards described
above, but a vastly huger one: we consider a graph P whose vertices are
all connected k-partitions of Γ – or, better, all connected k-partitions corre-
sponding to districtings compliant with state and federal law. I’ve told you
the vertices; what are the edges? Here’s where things get really interesting.
There are different choices, and the corresponding random walks may cer-
tainly have different behavior. The simplest and in some ways most natural
case is that of the “flip graph,” in which two vertices are adjacent in P just
when the corresponding partitions differ with respect to only one vertex of
Γ. That is a gigantic graph whose structure we know next to nothing about.
But given a vertex Π of this graph, we can generate a list of its neighbors;
each vertex adjacent to Π is obtained by a “flip”: take a ward in district i
which lies on the boundary with district j, and reassign it to district j, as
long as this violates no legal constraint. It’s easy to list and sample from
all possible flips; so we can efficiently carry out a random walk on P , and
thereby generate a large population of legally acceptable districtings. If you
want to bias your walk towards districtings whose districts have more com-
pact shapes, or shatter fewer counties, or whatever, you can weight your
choice of moves in the random walk to promote those virtues, in the style of
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A step in the ReCom process (Figure 4 in [9])
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. In other words: the distribution we want
to sample from isn’t the uniform distribution, because we prefer some maps
to others, so we set up our walk to get the stationary distribution we desire.
This is the walk we see used in the work of Herschlag-Ravier-Mattingly [15]
on the Wisconsin Assembly districts. We can then identify the problematic
maps as those whose electoral outcomes are extreme outliers in the sample
distribution.
Another graph structure you can put on P is the recombination graph [9].
Suppose Π is a districting. Then a neighbor of Π is obtained as follows.
Choose two adjacent districts. Merge them into one. Then split the new
double-sized district into two connected pieces of roughly equal size. That’s
a ReCom move, and two districtings are adjacent if a ReCom move sends
one to the other.
But didn’t I just say the problem of sampling uniformly from the set
of 2-partitions is hard? And isn’t that just what choosing a ReCom move
requires us to do? Well, not quite. In the ReCom process, the splitting
of the double-sized district D is not uniform over the set of all 2-partitions.
Instead, we proceed as follows. Choose a spanning tree T uniformly from the
set of all spanning trees of D; this we can do uniformly in polynomial time,
by Wilson’s algorithm referenced above.3 Now choose an edge at random,
subject to the constraint that deleting the edge splits the vertices of T into
two roughly equal parts T1, T2; then the vertices of T1 and T2 constitute a
partition of the vertices of D into two subsets. Now the restriction of P to
the vertices of Ti for each i contains a tree, and so is connected; we have
constructed the desired 2-partition of D.4
(I can’t resist pointing out in passing that the set of spanning trees of a
planar graph has an extremely interesting structure. By Kirchhoff’s matrix-
tree theorem, the number of spanning trees is the same as the order of the
finite abelian group alternately called the sandpile group, the Pic0 of the
graph, or the tropical Jacobian. When the graph is planar, a beautiful
categorification of this numerical identity holds: the set of spanning trees is
3The Kruskal-Karger algorithm is just as good in practice, and is sometimes used in
ReCom implementations.
4There are variants of ReCom which choose the 2-partition in a different way, but for
simplicity we’ll stick to spanning tree recombination in these notes.
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canonically a torsor for the sandpile group.![4],[2]. Is there any chance that
the tropical viewpoint on graphs is useful for computation?)
The non-uniformity of the choice of the 2-partition might at first seem
artificial, but in fact it’s more feature than bug! A uniformly chosen 2-
partition typically has a long, snaky boundary, a sort of space-filling curve.
The partitions coming from the spanning tree method, by contrast, are
strongly biased towards having short boundaries; in graph-theoretic terms,
there tend to be few edges of D joining vertices of T1 to vertices of T2.
For the flip walk, we need to build a preference for compact districts into
the weights of the random walk if we want to get decent-looking districts;
ReCom, by contrast, tends to form compact districts without any extra
infrastructure. What’s more, the ReCom walk appears to converge to a
stationary distribution more efficiently than does the flip walk, although it
is more difficult to describe in explicit terms what the stationary distribution
is. Gaining a better understanding of the stationary distributions attached
to various random walks on k-partitions is one of the richest open problems
in the subject, and is of interest not only in practical terms but as a question
in pure stochastic processes.
Yet another appealing feature of the ReCom walk is that software to do
it is open-source and publicly available [18]; I encourage you to mess with
it yourself!
Ensemble sampling has proven to provide a more effective, convincing,
and intuitive quantitative measure of gerrymandering than those before it.
It was the centerpiece of the gerrymandering cases presented to the Supreme
Court in 2019; a bipartisan twin set, one (Rucho v. Common Cause) ad-
dressing a district map gerrymandered by Republicans in North Carolina,
the other (Lamone v. Benisek) a map gerrymandered by Democrats in
Maryland. I don’t know if this is the most mathematical case the Supreme
Court has ever addressed, but I believe it is the first time the Court received
a ”Mathematicians’ Brief,” an amicus brief signed by eleven mathematical
scientists, including me, explaining the quantitative aspects of the case.
In Rucho and Lamone, I hurry to point out, the Supreme Court ruled that
partisan gerrymandering was not justiciable; that is, it was not a matter
where the federal courts had the right to intervene. To anyone who had
been following the mathematical study of redistricting, the court’s decision
was puzzling. Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, says:
Partisan gerrymandering claims invariably sound in5 a desire
for proportional representation. As Justice O’Connor put it,
such claims are based on a conviction that the greater the
departure from proportionality, the more suspect an appor-
tionment plan becomes.
5As best I can tell from my lawyer friends, “sound in” here means something in between
“derives from” and ”amounts to” – and people say we talk in impenetrable jargon!
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I am not weighing in on the legal merits of the decision when I say that
this claim is wildly off the mark. As we have seen, proportional represen-
tation is not the aim of any modern measure of electoral fairness, or any
claim brought before the court in the 2019 districting cases (It may in-
deed have been an issue 33 years ago, when Justice O’Connor wrote the
words Roberts quotes in her concurrence in Davis v. Bandemer) Indeed,
one measure arising in contemporary cases, the efficency gap, is incompati-
ble with proportional representation, while the ensemble sampling methods
(correctly, in my view) are orthogonal to proportional representation. In
some case a map that yields proportional-representation outcomes would be
licensed by those methods; in other cases, like U.S. congressional districts in
Massachusetts, a map yielding proportional representation would be flagged
as an extreme outlier [11].
To be clear, the Supreme Court did not take seriously any claims that ger-
rymandering had not taken place, and indeed the majority decision endorsed
the view that the practice of gerrymandering is “incompatible with demo-
cratic principles.” The Court’s decision rests on the fact that some things
are incompatible with democratic principles but not incompatible with the
Constitution. When this is held to be the case, the federal judiciary walks
on by with eyes modestly averted. But the Court did portray partisan ger-
rymandering as a problem somebody – just not the Justices themselves –
ought to remedy.
And indeed, the arguments derived from ensemble sampling have found
more purchase elsewhere. In 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court threw
out the state’s U.S. Congressional district map, relying heavily on expert
testimony from Jowei Chen and from Wesley Pegden, a mathematician at
Carnegie Mellon (more on Pegden’s work just down the page!) identify-
ing the map as an extreme partisan outlier from a random walk ensemble.
Pegden was subsequently appointed by Governor Tom Wolf to serve on the
Pennsylvania Redistricting Reform Commission, along with the more tradi-
tional group of elected officials and community leaders you might expect to
find on a political panel like this. Wolf also enlisted Moon Duchin to help
evaluate replacement districting plans. In North Carolina, a state court
similarly found that state legislative districts drawn by the majority in the
state legislature violated both the Free Elections Clause and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the North Carolina Constitution. Their decision, like the
one in Pennsylvania, is deeply rooted in the analysis of ensemble samples,
citing testimony of Jonathan Mattingly as well as Pegden and Chen. (To
get a sense of what kind of testimony mathematicians provide, you could
look at Mattingly’s expert report in that case [16].) One key point from a
legal perspective is that ensemble methods can make local assessments, not
just global ones as the efficiency gap does, identifying individual districts as
outliers, which helps courts in several ways. It makes it easier identify harm
to individual voters; it can provide courts with a remedy that throws out
only part of the map instead of the whole thing; and, most importantly, it
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presents judges with a clearer picture of how gerrymandering is accomplish-
ing its goals.
I don’t want to leave the impression that ensemble sampling is an infalli-
ble gerrymandering detector. Many challenges, some purely mathematical,
others intertwining math and law, remain.
A central open question concerns speed of mixing. A random walk on a
connected graph converges to the stationary distribution. But how quickly
it converges is a delicate matter, involving, among other things, the spectral
gap of the adjacency matrix of the graph. For the graph P of k-partitions,
we have no control over mixing time, and so no guarantee that the ensem-
bles obtained by random walk are drawn from the stationary distribution.
Indeed, if we impose on P the condition that the k components of the par-
tition have roughly the same size, as far as I know there is no proof that
P is even connected! Even if P is connected, it might have a “long neck”
connecting two large regions
If our random walk starts on one of those regions,, crossing the neck
is a very low-probability event; so even if we run the random walk for a
long time, we may be approximating a distribution which is far from the
stationary one, but rather approximates a distribution supported on one
side of the neck.
From a political and legal perspective, it’s not clear this matters. Suppose
a district map Π tends to give the Purple Party 60 out of 100 seats, and
suppose this figure is an outlier in a sample of maps near Π in P , 99.9% of
which give the Purple Party at most 55 seats. One cannot strictly rule out
the existence of an “undiscovered country” of districtings in which 60 Purple
seats are the norm. But the ensemble sample still feels like very strong
evidence that this map Π, so unusual among its neighbors, was not picked
out indifferently to its Purple-friendliness. This insight was formalized and
made into a theorem by Chikina, Frieze, and Pegden ([6], see also [7]) who
obtain a provable threshold for statistical significance without any need for
a bound on mixing time. We’ll state their result in the language of random
walks on graphs, though it actually holds for any reversible Markov chain.6
They prove: for any small  > 0, and any real-valued score function ω on the
vertices of a graph G, the probability that a vertex v0 of P chosen uniformly
(the null hypothesis) has a higher score than 1−  of the first k vertices in a
random walk starting from v0 is at most
√
2. This allows you, if you like,
to assess gerrymandering using traditional frequentist-statistical tools like
statistical significance.
Nonetheless, the question of what kind of mixing time one expects for
random walks of various flavors on sets of k-partitions of planar graphs is a
really interesting one. In practice, as we have mentioned, the ReCon walk
seems to converge substantiallly more efficiently than does the flip walk.
6The flip walk, in its most commonly used form, is reversible, but the ReCom walk
isn’t; see [3] for a reversible modification of ReCom.
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Why? And are there still more effiicient graph structures on P out there
to be exploited? The study of mixing on these graphs has the flavor of
statistical physics and the theory of self-avoiding random walks; see the re-
cent paper of Najt, DeFord, and Solomon [20] for this connection, together
with questions about the way different discretizations of the same planar
landscape can yield surprisingly large differences in the behavior of the cor-
responding random walks.
Another challenge of ensemble sampling is that different elections are
different. One certainly doesn’t want to say that an individual voter is,
once and for all, a Democrat or a Republican whose voting behavior is
independent of time and the individual candidates on the ballot. If we did
say this, empirical data would contradict us. In practice, what this means
is that a given map may be an extreme outlier in some elections and not in
others. Take, for instance, the map of Wisconsin state assembly districts. In
2012, a year when the statewide vote for Assembly seats in Wisconsin was
very close to 50-50, the result of 60 seats for Republicans was very different
from the ensemble-modal value of 55 seats. But two years later, in 2014,
the electorate leaned much more towards Republicans; and in that election,
the 63 seats won by Republicans sit comfortably in the middle of the range
of outcomes produced by the ensemble.
So is the Wisconsin district map an extreme outlying gerrymander, or is
it not? The work of Herschlag, Ravier, and Mattingly [15] provides critical
insight here. A district map, remember, is made without knowledge of ex-
actly who is going to vote, or how. The dark art of gerrymandering has to
be robust to this basic uncertainty. And there are tradeoffs: maximizing the
extent to which the map helps your party under one set of circumstances
may make the map less effective under other conditions, or even hurt your
party if things go really sideways. Herschlag-Ravier-Mattingly find that the
Wisconsin map is designed as a sort of “firewall.” In electoral environments
where the statewide vote leans Republican, the gerrymander doesn’t do
much work. But when the electorate is split evenly or even leaning slightly
Democratic, it provides a powerful force towards maintaining a Republican
majority in the assembly. The gerrymander works exactly when, at least
according to the desires of its makers, it needs to work, locking in a Repub-
lican seat majority over the whole range of statewide electoral conditions one
might reasonably expect to encounter in an evenly split state like Wisconsin.
3. What’s next?
The study of random walks applied to districting has developed very
rapidly in the last five years, and provides opporunities for an extraordinarily
direct interaction between advanced mathematics and public policy. But the
story is far from over, and there’s a lot of work still to do for mathematicians
interested in these problems.
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Part of the work is outreach. Moon Duchin and Jonathan Mattingly have
both launched centers – respectively, the Metric Geometry and Gerryman-
dering Group at Tufts, and the Quantifying Gerrymandering group at Duke
– which serve as clearinghouses for new research on districting and launch-
pads for both early-career and senior mathematical scientists interesting in
getting involved.
There is also much more mathematics to do, besides the rich vein of
questions indicated above about mixing times for Markov process on the
k-partitions of planar graphs. One key question, which has been raised a
lot but so far has not been extensively addressed, is: what to do about
situations where there are more than two parties? Suppose I don’t care
for either Purple nor Orange, preferring the Ecru Party to either one. But
perhaps, if Ecru is not an option, I like Orange better than Purple. In a first-
past-the-post system like that in the U.S., my voting behavior may depend
on the district I’m drawn into. If Ecru has no chance and Orange and Purple
are close, I may vote Orange to stop Purple. But if Purple is safely ahead in
my district, I’m more likely to vote my Ecru conscience. Everything about
voting behavior is much harder to analyze when more than two parties
have substantial support; the problem of districting is no exception. In
a U.S. context, where parties other than Democrats and Republicans are
very rarely competitive for legislative seats, one might this question can be
ignored. But the U.S. is not the only country with geographic districts.
What’s more, many American jurisdictions, including the entire state of
Maine, have abandoned first-past-the-post in favor of ranked-choice voting.
To the extent RCV becomes mainstream, there will likely be more votes for
candidates other than Democrats and Republicans; it seems prudent to have
the mathematical machinery for analyzing districtings ready in advance.
What is the future for this interaction between mathematics and politics?
The Supreme Court has, for now, put an end to the idea that political par-
ties nationwide will be forbidden from extreme gerrymandering. In some
states, like Pennsylvania and North Carolina, courts will throw out exist-
ing gerrymandered maps; in others, like Ohio and Michigan, legislation or
ballot initiatives will delegate the process of redistricting to non-partisan
panels. In both cases, though, there are still fundamental design questions:
if the process of drawing the map isn’t to be “party operatives in a smoke-
filled room tweak and twist the districting until it delivers every possible
advantage to their party,” what is the right process?
One question that comes to many mathematicians’ minds at this point
is: if we can generate an ensemble of thousands and thousands of potential
district maps, which are compliant with the Voting Rights Act and other
legal constraints, which perform well on traditional districting criteria like
compactness and county-splitting, and which are completely indifferent to
which party does better, why don’t we . . . just pick one of those maps at
random and call it a day?
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The reasons are political. Which doesn’t mean they’re not good reasons!
For one thing, algorithmic maps will inevitably miss criteria specific to the
case at hand that are legitimately important to constituents. As DeFord,
Duchin, and Solomon write in their report on districting alternatives in Vir-
ginia [19], “We emphasize that these ensemble methods should not be used
to select a plan for enactment because they are made without local and
community-based considerations. Instead, ensemble methods give an effec-
tive means of verifying whether a newly proposed plan is an extreme outlier
in the universe of valid plans.” Even when used as a benchmark, a process
like ensemble sampling is viewed with some suspicion by political actors.
They can’t see what’s under the hood. To actually hand over map-drawing
power to the algorithm is something neither elected officials nor their con-
stituents are likely to swallow. To a lesser extent, proposals to delegate the
power to an independent nonpartisan commission – say, retired judges or a
panel of state residents – meet the same resistance (from legislators, if not
from their constituents, who have recently voted for such plans by refer-
endum in Colorado, Michigan, Missouri, and Utah.) Elected officials, as a
rule, don’t like relinquishing powers the existing framework affords them.
But how can there possibly be a fair protocol for district-drawing if the
district-drawing is to be done by the legislature itself? In [21] Pegden,
Procaccia, and Yu propose a really interesting idea, deriving from an en-
tirely different area of math: the theory of fair-division games. That theory
descends from a single algorithm: ”I cut you choose.” Two players, who
perhaps don’t trust or even like each other, want to divide a cake, and each
wants to make sure the other doesn’t get more than their share. (See the
relevance?) Algorithm: one player cuts the cake in two pieces, and the other
picks which piece they get. The cutter has an incentve to make the division
as close to 50-50 as possible, and the chooser, if the cutter does their job
properly, is indifferent to the choice they’re presented with. The algorithm
doesn’t enforce fairness; but it leaves both parties to the decision feeling like
they had a fair chance to affect the outcome.
The Pegden-Procaccia-Yu protocol is called “I cut you freeze.” It’s a game
where Purple and Orange take turns. They start with the district map
Π = Π1, . . .Πk as it currently exists. At each stage, some subset of the
districts is frozen – the boundaries of those districts are fixed and can no
longer be modified on later turns. Each turn has two parts: you freeze one
of the not-yet-frozen districts, then you redistrict the unfrozen part of the
map however you like, then you pass the new map over to the other player.
The game ends when all the districts are frozen, each party having locked in
the final form of half the districts. (This might be better called ”I freeze and
cut, then you freeze and cut,” but I think the authors’ choice to contract this
for euphony was a wise one.) Note, crucially, that the district a player gets
to freeze is one chosen from a map created by the other party; if the steps
were reversed, so that each party redistricted the unfrozen part of the map
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first and then froze a district of their own making, it would be substantially
easier for parties to create mischievous districts.
There are lots of possible game protocols one could use for redistricting,
and the Pegden-Procaccia-Yu paper has inspired several competing propos-
als. Understanding which, if any, provides a suitably effective buffer against
extreme gerrymandering while remaining palatable to elected officials and
compliant with legal requirements is a rich and fundamentally interdisci-
plinary question which we’ve just started to penetrate.
So far, the role of mathematicians in districting has been a form of dam-
age control – we come in to assess the outcome of decisions that have already
been made, under a regime of rules already been set in place. The work of
Pegden, Procaccia, and Yu is an example of a deeper interaction that’s just
starting to take shape, namely: which regimes of rules would lead to better
outcomes? This is especially important at this time of flux, when the issue
of districting is at its highest political salience in years and many states are
launching brand-new commissions. Decisions about the design of the dis-
tricting process and the rules governing it are going to have consequences for
decades to come, and it seems like a really good idea for mathematicians to
be in the room when those decisions are being made.7 Considering different
rules and figuring out what would follow from them is kind of our thing.
Ensemble sampling is well-suited for the task because it enables us to
efficiently explore the space of what’s possible under various collections of
rules. People may once have thought that requiring districts to have equal
population ensures fair representation; we now know that’s not true. Nor are
traditional geometric notions like ”compactness” enough. The picture asso-
ciated with “gerrymandering” for most people is a bizarrely shaped branch-
ing snake of a district, drawn to its odd contours to achieve an electoral
result. There are districts like that in real life, but it turns out requiring
districts to be roughly round 8 is also not sufficient to prevent strong par-
tisan gerrymandering. Ensemble methods have also shown that rules which
are facially neutral to party, like maximization of the number of competi-
tive districts, can introduce partisan bias [8]. What’s more, the ensemble
method speaks to much more than the number of seats each party wins –
that’s just one statistic attached to the maps in the ensemble. Which rules
promote, or suppress, the power of minority voters? Which tend to lead to
more competitive districts? What are the tradeoffs between properties of
district maps we think of as virtues? The mathematics of redistriciting isn’t
just a gerrymandering detector; it is, at least potentially, a full-fledged tool
7Maybe we could have kept Missouri from enshrining in its state constitution the
principle that “In general, compact districts are those which are square, rectangular, or
hexagonal in shape.” It’s ironic that Missouri, a trapezoid, would be so hostile to general
quadrilaterals.
8in whatever sense: see [12] for a suggestion of a discretized notion of compactness which
seems better suited for modern applications than the many, many traditional methods in
use.
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for the exploration of the mysterious space of protocols for representative
democracy.
Whether the future of districting in the United States is independent
commissions put in place by popular ballot initiatives, intricate games of
bipartisan cake-cutting, or the status quo of entrenched parties grimly max-
imizing their own interest, is a political question. But it’s a political question
shot through with mathematical content, and thanks to the work discussed
here, the mathematical community has gotten engaged with this content to
an extent rarely seen in American politics. I hope this engagement continues,
and I hope some of the audience here will become part of it!
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